Ghana’s central bank executed one of the most perplexing financial decisions in recent memory: selling nearly half its gold reserves at USD 3,500 per ounce in late 2025, only to announce plans three months later to buy the same quantity back at USD 5,500 per ounce under a new policy framework.
The numbers tell a damning story. In the fourth quarter of 2025, the Bank of Ghana liquidated approximately 18.5 tonnes of gold, generating USD 2.22 billion in proceeds. By early 2026, the government unveiled the Ghana Accelerated National Reserve Accumulation Policy (GHANRAP) 2026–2028, committing to repurchase the identical amount at a significantly higher price point. The estimated cost: USD 3.49 billion. The implied loss on this round-trip transaction: approximately USD 1.27 billion—a sum that could have funded critical infrastructure or social programmes across the country.
A scathing analytical review by the Institute of Political Studies–Ghana (IPS-Ghana) has questioned the timing and rationale for the original sale. The analysis reveals that gold prices were rising throughout 2024 and 2025, driven by global demand for safe-haven assets amid geopolitical tensions and currency concerns. Bank of Ghana data shows prices climbing from USD 2,568 per ounce in September 2024 to USD 3,666.52 by September 2025. More critically, international prices had already surged to USD 4,054 per ounce by October 2025—meaning the BoG’s Q4 sale at USD 3,500 per ounce was executed at a significant discount to market rates.
“A central bank that sold gold at USD 3,500/oz while prices were rising, then announced a policy to buy it back at USD 5,500/oz three months later, has not demonstrated the characteristics of a disciplined, long-horizon reserve manager,” the IPS-Ghana report states.
The Bank of Ghana has yet to provide public justification for why liquidating nearly half its reserves was necessary when the macroeconomic picture was reportedly improving and global central banks were actively buying gold. The analysis raises critical questions about policy coherence, reserve management discipline, and transparency in handling Ghana’s national assets—especially given the country’s ongoing fiscal consolidation efforts under an IMF-supported programme.
The USD 1.27 billion implied cost demands rigorous public accounting and parliamentary scrutiny. For a nation managing external pressures and exchange rate volatility, this transaction represents a substantial drain on resources that warrants full disclosure and explanation to Ghanaians.
